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Algorithmic social ordering. Towards a conceptual framework
EYERT, Florian, IRGMAIER, Florian, ULBRICHT, Lena
Weizenbaum Institute for the Networked Society, Germany
Introduction
As the possibilities of digital technology continue to expand, its advance into more and more
parts of everyday life and societal organization seems to assume a new quality. Increasingly,
automatic information and decision-making systems are used to structure social processes,
replace human judgement and generate order, as captured in the concepts of “algorithmic
management” (Lee et al. 2015), “algorithmic regulation” (Yeung 2017a), “algocracy” (Aneesh
2009) and “governance by algorithms” (Just & Latzer 2017). It seems that governance and
management is becoming more granular, subtle, responsive, encompassing and networked.
Given the enormous possible consequences, we aim to contribute to a systematic
understanding of these developments by analysing them from a particular conceptual
perspective: the intersection of regulation and quantification.
Our general approach is shaped by the question of social order and the mechanisms of its
establishment and perpetuation. In the social sciences this foundational problem usually refers
to societies in general, as in Hobbes’s political thought and its sociological interpretation by
Talcott Parsons (1966), but it is also central for processes at the micro- and meso-level.
Following Berger and Luckmann, we stress that social order is “an ongoing human production”
(Berger & Luckmann 1991, 69), and propose to analyse the current societal transformations from
the perspective of regulation as a specific form of such social ordering.
With Julia Black, we understand regulation as “the sustained and focused attempt to alter the
behaviour of others according to defined standards or purposes with the intention of producing
a broadly identified outcome [...].” (Black 2002, 26) It is set apart from other forms of social
ordering in four main dimensions. Unlike tradition or the habitus, it is intentional. Unlike
spontaneous acts of violence, its perspective is one of permanence. Unlike government, it
includes a variety of actors beyond the state. And unlike Weber’s domination, it is analytically
independent of legitimacy. We believe that by developing a clear conceptual understanding of
regulation and its technological components, we will be able to track the implications of the
digital transformation for regulation and social ordering more generally. Informed by cybernetics,
Christopher Hood, Henry Rothstein and Robert Baldwin (2001) have developed such an
analytical framework for regulation, dissecting it into three components: information gathering,
standard setting, and behaviour modification.
In order to address the problems at hand, we draw on and aim to contribute to three main
strands of literature. 
The sociology of quantification, valuation and classification has recently gained importance due
to a an expansion of rankings, ratings and scores. It discusses the causes and consequences of
the growing reliance on numbers in all parts of society. By transforming a continuous reality into
a discrete representation, quantification promises to render human affairs increasingly
commensurable and calculable, thereby increasing possibilities for control (Mau 2017). But
while some authors have emphasized the role of digital technology in this process, until now we
lack an understanding both of the concrete technological logic and the broader social
implications of these processes. Supported by the spread of ever more powerful computer
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technology, quantification increasingly assumes the form of an immense datafication. “Big data”
and the “data deluge” are looming over an increasing number of segments of modern society.
We believe that a conceptual understanding of algorithmic regulation could make a contribution
here.
Another crucial point of reference is the literature on regulation. While a large part of regulatory
studies has pursued a “command and control” (Black 2002) view of regulation with a strong
focus on the state and its legal tools, more recently a part of the literature has turned towards a
wider and more decentred understanding of regulation. Furthermore, notions such as “code is
law” (Lessig 2006) or “regulation by design” (Yeung 2008) have disclosed the role of technology
in regulation. These analyses provide a valuable starting point, but especially regarding the
technological dimension of regulation a lot of work still remains to be done.
Finally, science, technology and society studies provide our primary access point to
understanding the interaction between technological artefacts and social processes. Bruno
Latour and others have proposed a shift towards a “sociology of associations” (Latour 2005) that
cultivates an interest in the complex entanglements and assemblings of human and non-human
actants. It is in such a way that we are enabled to study the myriad of small changes that add up
to the rise of new digital forms of regulation and regulatory regimes.
Bridging the three literatures promises a fruitful and original perspective from which digitalization
becomes visible as a non-linear, socially constructed and inherently political process. In the
following we will sketch a conceptual framework that can guide such research.
A framework for studying algorithmic regulation
Our starting point for the analysis of regulation is a classic framework from regulatory studies,
first spelled out by Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin (2001). This perspective adopts a cybernetic
angle by analyzing regulation along the three components of information gathering, standard
setting and behaviour modification. Karen Yeung (2017a) has drawn on this approach in her
recent analysis of what she, adopting the term from O’Reilly (2013), refers to as algorithmic
regulation. Her systematization is a valuable step towards a conceptual framework that we
would like to build on by extending it with a number of further analytical distinctions.
The first component is that of information gathering, which is any form of collecting knowledge
about some segment of reality that is to be regulated. It involves an epistemic process of
construction based on information as well as their interpretation and modelling (Mahr 2003). The
increasing datafication of both processes has led to the current duality of big data and machine
learning. Karen Yeung has distinguished between reactive and preemptive information
gathering, where the former uses given data to detect violations and the latter uses it to predict
future behaviour (Yeung 2017a). For a further analysis, Bruno Latour’s notion of “immutable
mobiles” provides a fruitful starting point. Immutable mobiles for him are inscriptions that are
“mobile but also immutable, presentable, readable and combinable with one another” (Latour
1990a) and thereby allow control at a distance. In an iconic way, this is illustrated by the map
that makes it possible to control the territory.
With Latour we can analyze modern digital information systems as an environment for new and
more effective forms of immutable mobiles, which crucially rely on what Adrian MacKenzie, in his
ethnography of machine learning, has called “vectorization”: the “drawing together” of a variety
of heterogeneous aspects of reality into a mathematically well described feature space in which
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every concrete object can be represented as a vector (MacKenzie 2015). But every such vector
is characterized by a complexity gap towards the reality it describes, which is why Susan Star
concludes that no mobiles are completely immutable (Star 1995, 91). The local specificities
undermine the modular and standardized descriptions of immutable mobiles. James Scott has
developed the concept of “legibilization” (Scott 1998) to describe such simplifications aimed at
control for the pre-digital world and we think it is highly relevant for the digital one as well.
In order to analyze the strategic implications of such immutable mobiles as tools of legibilization,
we propose to look at different kinds of algorithmic tools that can be employed in epistemic
models for regulation. Examples would be simple deductive models along an IF-THEN logic,
statistical models gained from training sets through supervised learning or mathematical
optimization procedures that recommend analytically optimal behaviour. These tools, along with
Slota’s and Bowker’s recent remark (2016) that knowledge is temporalized in new ways through
algorithms, suggest that regulation might become more and more adaptive.
The second, primarily normative component is that of standard setting. It refers to the goals that
are to be obtained by regulation. Karen Yeung distinguishes between fixed and adaptive
standards, i.e., those that are determined once and for all and those that can change over time
(Yeung 2017a, 3).
In order to become social realities, goals and standards of regulation undergo a process of
definition, translation and calculation. No goal or standard ‘speaks for itself’, it needs indicators
to be accessible and assessable. Goals and standards can take various forms: they can be
shaped by a social domain or by a discipline, as in the case of the conflict between technical
and legal standards; they can be area-specific, as in public health or commercial services; they
can be abstract, like democratic values or customer satisfaction, or specific, like a 5% increase
in users who are over 40 or a 1 pound weight loss within a month. The measurement can be
quantitative or qualitative, direct or indirect, objective or subjective and absolute or relational.
Whereas rules are always subject to interpretation due to the indeterminacy of language, code is
binary and, even if not accurate, inherently determined. In order to be processed by algorithms,
developers need to define their goals and standards in a way that can be applied to the data
available. This requires the operationalization of broader goals that breaks them down into a
variety of measurable entities. A specificity of algorithmic regulation is then the easy combination
of more stable general goals and adaptive sub-standards.
Behaviour modification, finally, encompasses the effective dimension of regulation: the actions
through which a decision is enforced. It is the attempt to move the regulated entity closer
towards a desirable state by deploying appropriate means. Yeung distinguishes between such
systems that automatically administer specific sanctions or decisions and those that keep a
human “on the loop” (ibid., 4), but while being useful, this distinction reveals little about how
behaviour is actually modified.
From the perspective of behaviour modification, regulation is successful to the extent that
undesired forms of behaviour are rendered improbable. It is therefore dependent on a relation of
strength and resistance or, in Latour’s words, on a relation between “programs” and “anti-
programs” (Latour 1990b, 105ff.). “Programs” are those factors that contribute to steering the
behaviour of a particular entity — be it human or not — in a direction deemed desirable.
Modifying behaviour thus means mobilizing all available programs from which desired effects
can be expected. “Anti-programs”, in contrast, refer to all the factors moving a particular entity in
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a direction other than the one desired (Latour 1992; 1990b, 105). This category encompasses
everything that increases the likelihood a regulatory attempt fails (from the viewpoint of the
regulator). If a program is to be successful, it thus has to neutralize all anti-programs, i.e., all
counteracting factors, so that the entity in question behaves in the desired way.
In his famous vignette about a hotel manager trying to ensure that guests leave their room keys
at the counter before going for a walk, Latour points out two strategies for developing successful
programs: acting on the customers and their interpretation of the world or acting on the key itself
by attaching a weight to it that makes it uncomfortable to carry around (Latour 1990b). For
Latour, this is the distinction between incorporation and excorporation. Elaborating on these two
notions is a useful way of discerning types of behaviour modification.
Incorporation operates through the modification of the inner working of the regulated entity. In
Foucauldian terms, we could speak of processes of subjectivation (Foucault 1990) and
discipline (Foucault 1995, 135ff.): of internalizing subjective norms and values and creating
bodily or mental routines and conditioning. An example of the former can be found in
“lifelogging” and related practices of data-based self-monitoring that affect individuals’
subjectivities and, thus, their individual behaviour, e.g., by increasing sporting activity (Schaupp
2016). The latter form of incorporation is employed, for instance, in what Fogg calls “conditioning
technology”, i.e., “[c]omputing technology [using] positive reinforcement to shape complex
behaviour or transform existing behaviors into habits” (Fogg 2003, 53; see also Berlin Script
Collective 2017, 24).
Excorporation, in contrast, focusses on environments and situations rather than on individuals
themselves. Madeleine Akrich’s (1992) analysis of how innovators inscribe normative
assumptions into technology is instructive here. Building on a recent paper by the Berlin Script
Collective (2017), we can distinguish three types of such behaviour modification through
technological environments: coercion, inducement and the initiation of re-interpretations through
the provision of knowledge. In each of these three cases, behaviour modification operates by
(re)arranging the environment — e.g., through laws, taxes, or information campaigns — in such
a way that the desired behaviour is rendered the most (instrumentally or normatively) rational
option. To these three types of excorporate behaviour modification that make use of the rational
capacities of individuals we add a fourth one which we term influence through non-rational
properties: This type of influence makes use of the non-rational aspects of human behaviour and
has been popularized by the debate about “nudges” and their mechanisms that exploit
“heuristics and biases” (Thaler & Sunstein 2008; for digital environments, this kind of influence
has also been explored by Yeung 2017b). The “status quo bias” for instance can be utilized
through purposeful setting of technological defaults. As the fields of Persuasive Computing and
Human-Computer Interaction show, digital technologies can be applied in all four of these types.
Concluding this brief sketch of the framework, it is important to note that the three components
should not be understood as successive phases. In reality, they are always intertwined, as the
following case illustrates.
 
The example of Uber
As an illustration, the framework is now applied to the well-researched case of the personal
transportation platform Uber and its regulation of drivers. Uber drivers usually register with the
app and then indicate that they are currently available for work. While they are, they will be
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matched with a nearby waiting customer, which they can accept or decline. If they accept, they
are expected to pick up the customer and take them to their destination along a route suggested
by the app. After the ride, the driver receives a rating from the customer. For the following
discussion we apply our framework to the empirical descriptions by Lee et al. (2015), Rosenblat
and Stark (2016) and Scheiber (2017).
Information gathering: Firstly, our framework focuses on the ways in which the regulatees and
the environment are modelled by Uber, i.e., which aspects are digitally represented, which
information is gathered and how that information is then used to shape the whole work process.
Uber records and processes various kinds of information through its app and the sensors
integrated in smartphones. This includes the locations of drivers and customers, but also
aspects of the drivers’ driving behaviour, for instance, their braking and accelerating.
Furthermore, map data, traffic information and the location of other drivers are taken into
account.
However, other aspects such as the altruistic and non-economic motivations of drivers, the
condition of the car or the road, the emotional state of the customer, the traffic policy of the city
or the current weather are, to our knowledge, not taken into account. It has to be stressed at this
point that it is Uber alone who defines what kinds of information are gathered — not the drivers,
nor the customers.
Standard setting: Uber’s general goal of maximizing revenue is broken down into a number of
secondary standards which Uber deems fitting to achieve that goal: Optimally matching drivers
with passengers for short pickup times, suggesting to take Uber-chosen routes, reaching a
smooth driving behaviour, realizing a maximum price for the ride and improving the customers’
experience are among them.
Through a universal rating system, standard setting procedures are partly delegated from the
company to customers. After each ride, passengers evaluate their drivers through a five-star
rating system, without being restrained in their choice of criteria. This feature renders the
regulatory process decentral and dynamic because behaviour that got a driver five stars last
month may not get them five stars today. Here, too, it is insightful to look at those standards that
were seemingly not deemed relevant by Uber, such as the drivers’ health and happiness or
ecological aspects.
Behaviour modification: For the sake of brevity this analysis is limited to the excorporate
behaviour modification of drivers. Interestingly, all of the four types described above can be
found in the case of Uber.
1) Fear of coercion is used in the mechanism that drivers whose ratings fall below a certain level,
or who repeatedly decline ride requests or cancel rides, lose access to their accounts and are
excluded from the Uber market. Before this happens, the drivers receive warnings, which are —
of course — directly intended to change their behaviour.
2) Uber uses monetary inducement in a highly fine-grained and dynamic manner in order to
facilitate a favourable allocation between supply and demand. This is achieved through so
called “surge pricing”, a temporary and local rise in fares after the system has identified a high
demand in a certain area. This area will, for a limited time, be highlighted in red on the
interactive map of the app.
3) The driving assistance by the Uber system corresponds to the initiation of re-interpretations.
The most obvious means for this is the navigation function of the Uber driver app that ensures
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drivers go in the right direction, which is essential for an enterprise specialized in transportation.
Hence, local knowledge of streets and routes is not required for drivers. Preferably, drivers go
along an Uber-chosen route. However, the criteria for suggesting a given route are not disclosed
to the driver. It could be the shortest route or the route with maximum (or minimum) public
visibility of the Uber car itself.
4) Fourth and last, sophisticated influence is exerted by exploiting the non-rational
characteristics of drivers. For instance, Uber exploits people’s “loss aversion“, a phenomenon
well-documented in behavioural economics, in a specific way: When drivers are about to log off,
they receive a message reminding them of the money they would ‘lose’ by stopping now. For
instance, one message reads “Are you sure you want to go offline? Demand is very high in your
area. Make more money, don’t stop now!“ (Rosenblat & Stark 2016, 3768).
Further applications
The framework presented here is not limited to investigating the case of Uber. It can also shed
light on other cases in which technological artefacts are used for regulation. 
On the micro-level, we can analyse forms of technologically mediated self-regulation. Fitbits and
other kinds of wearable fitness trackers which are supposed to improve their users’ health are
striking examples. Sleep trackers like WakeMate or energy use trackers like Wattvision enable
similar kinds of self-regulation. A conceptual framework of regulation can add a fruitful
perspective to the ongoing debate about the “quantified self” (Lupton 2016).
On the meso-level, we can analyse organizational regulation that is supported by artefacts or
software. For instance, Raffetseder, Schaupp and Staab (2017) have investigated the software
Salesforce that is able to automatically assign incoming tasks to employees, according to
parameters such as current workload or experience. And recently, Amazon developed a
wristband that vibrates when employees in warehouses place goods in the wrong shelves
(Yeginsu 2018) – a form of excorporate behaviour modification that affords itself to quick
incorporation.
Our framework also allows us to analyse how whole populations or sub-populations are
regulated with the help of technology. Examples are computer-assisted forms of organizing the
criminal justice system (such as the ambitions of predictive policing products like PredPol or
sentencing software like Northpointe’s COMPAS), the automated curation of media content
practiced by Facebook through its Newsfeed algorithm or the spectacular vision of a unified
citizen score that currently haunts the newspapers with regards to the plans and actions of the
Chinese government.
Politicization
Another advantage of this framework is that it sheds light not only on the ways in which
algorithmic regulation operates, but also on the ways in which it is contested and politicized.
Many of the conflicts around algorithmic regulation can be attributed to one of the three
components.
Some conflicts mainly focus on the gathering and the modeling of data. For instance, many
privacy debates centre on the question who has the right to use which information, or which
categories of information are really necessary for providing a service (for the case of Uber, see
Zakrzewski 2015). In other cases, users request not less but more categories, for example
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concerning gender identities on Facebook (Bivens 2017). In a third group of cases, users
dispute the validity of inferred categories, for example the prediction of sexual orientation from
Facebook posts.
Standard setting is also a major site of contestation. Often, there are conflicts about the
purposes that are being served and about the indicators against which success is measured.
Many of debates also focus on the transparency and accountability of algorithmic decisions
(Pasquale 2015; Ananny & Crawford 2018), for instance when people demand knowing how
their creditworthiness is determined.
When it comes to behaviour modification, conflicts arise about what instruments are legitimate
and adequate. The current debates over the legitimacy of nudges (White 2013; Sunstein 2016)
or about political microtargeting (Zuiderveen Borgesius et al. 2018) provide vivid examples. In
essence, these are debates about whether certain forms of exerting influence can be reconciled
with human dignity or democracy.
The conflicts surrounding each of the three components also point towards what different forms
of algorithmic regulation might look like. They show that there are other possible ways of
gathering and processing information, other ways of defining goals, and other ways of
influencing people. By criticizing the status quo, and by articulating other possibilities, the
persons involved insist that there is a choice between different forms of establishing social
order. In this sense, each of the three components, or all of them, can become politicized.
 
Conclusion
In this contribution, we have, in due brevity, sketched a framework for analysing regulation in
different spheres of society. As an illustration of its applicability, we have shown cursorily how
the regulation of drivers by Uber can be made sense of. Additionally, we have pointed towards
other examples of information gathering, standard setting, and behaviour modification. We think
that the framework presented above can make at least four contributions to science, technology
and society studies. Firstly, it further differentiates the ways in which behaviour can be
influenced through technology by taking into account a number of different theoretical angles.
Secondly, focusing not only on influence, but also on data, models, and standards allows us to
trace how different kinds of regulation are composed by establishing links between different
building blocks. Thirdly, this framework helps us make sense of the digital transformation
precisely because it is not limited to it; rather, we can compare digital and non-digital ways of
regulation, and can thus determine what is and what isn’t unique about the digital
transformation. Lastly, it allows us to distinguish various forms of political struggles around
algorithmic regulation by directing scholarly attention to the regulatory components that are
being politicized.
Of course, the framework is no end in itself, but has to prove itself in empirical work. Future
research will therefore be dedicated to refining it and using it to conduct comparative research.
As a result of this, we hope to identify typical combinations of attributes across the three
components. Such clusters would then allow a more detailed and contextualized understanding
of algorithmic regulation and might point to strategies typical for specific spheres of society or
levels of organization. Finally, such an analytical approach therefore promises a better informed
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